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Abstract
In this paper I investigate the investment behavior of SRI investors
based on SRI mutual fund ﬂows. Speciﬁcally, I analyze how SRI investors
react to past performance and ethical standards. This empirical study
shows that over the years along with the development of the SRI fund mar-
ket, the performance sensitivity of SRI investors has increased. Today, SRI
investors chase past top performing funds at least as much as conventional
investors do. Besides performance, SRI investors care about the actual
ethical standards of SRI funds. SRI funds with high ethical standards re-
garding the positive rating and especially regarding environment attract
higher inﬂows. I also ﬁnd that SRI investors are more likely to reinvest in
the same fund. Overall, I conclude that, like conventional investors, nowa-
days SRI investors chase previously top performing funds, but additionally
pay attention to the actual ethical standards of their investments.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G11, G20, M14
Keywords: Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, Socially Responsible Invest-
ing, Ethical Investment
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Interest in socially responsible investments (SRI) is steadily increasing. The
Social Investment Forum reports that about one out of nine dollars under
professional management in the US is invested according to socially responsible
investment criteria.1 In accordance with the growth of the SRI market the
number of SRI studies has also increased. Most SRI studies focus on the
performance of SRI mutual funds. Generally, these studies indicate that the
performance of SRI mutual funds is not worse than the performance of their
conventional counterparts.2 However, all these studies neglect the question of
what extent SRI investors actually care about performance.
The large body of literature on the investment decisions of conventional
mutual fund investors shows that conventional investors chase past top per-
forming funds, but do not sell poor performing funds to the same extent.3
They document an asymmetric and convex performance ﬂow relationship for
conventional funds. While it is assumed in the traditional ﬁnance literature
that conventional investors are risk-reward optimizers, SRI investors pursue by
deﬁnition not only ﬁnancial goals, but also non-ﬁnancial goals.4 This raises the
question of whether SRI investors behave diﬀerently from conventional investors.
1See Social Investment Forum (2008).
2See, e.g., Hamilton et al. (1993), Mallin et al. (1995), Gregory et al. (1997), Sauer (1997),
Statman (2000), Bauer et al. (2005), Bauer et al. (2006), Bello (2005), Kreander et al. (2005),
Gregory and Whittaker (2007) and Kempf and Osthoﬀ (2008). Schröder (2007) studies the
performance of indices and ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between SRI and conventional in-
dices. Derwall et al. (2005) and Kempf and Osthoﬀ (2007) study the performance of synthetic
stock portfolios based on SRI ratings and even document an outperformance of these synthetic
portfolios.
3See, e.g., Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998).
4See, e.g., Beal et al. (2005).
1In this paper I analyze the ﬂows into SRI funds to address the following
three main questions: (i) Do SRI investors care about performance? Especially,
does their performance sensitivity diﬀer from that of conventional investors and
does that performance sensitivity depend on the degree of maturity of the SRI
market? (ii) Do SRI investors care about the actual ethical standards of their
investments or do they just care about the label "SRI"? (iii) Are SRI investors
more likely to reinvest in the same fund than conventional investors because
of higher search costs? To explore these issues, I study the inﬂows of SRI and
conventional mutual funds in the US for the time period from 1993 to 2004.
I ﬁrst analyze the performance sensitivity of SRI investors and then compare
it to that of conventional investors. One might suspect that SRI investors
care less about performance in their investment decisions, because they pay
more attention to social and environmental issues. However, if SRI investors
can identify substitutes among the funds in the SRI segment regarding their
social and environmental aspects, they will choose the funds with the highest
performance: thus their reaction is performance sensitive. Whether SRI investors
are performance sensitive or not therefore depends on the number of alternatives
available in the SRI fund segment. I document that over the sample period I
investigate the number of SRI funds grew rapidly (see Section 2.1). I conjecture
that with the increasing number of SRI funds, the performance sensitivity
also increased, because SRI investors are more likely to ﬁnd alternatives. A
second argument which supports the assumption of an increasing performance
sensitivity over time is that the SRI pioneers cared less about performance and
later on the mainstream SRI investors cared more.
2Second I analyze whether SRI investors care about the actual ethical
standards of the SRI funds or whether they are simply satisﬁed with the funds
being labeled as SRI funds. I am the ﬁrst to examine this question. To measure
the ethical standards of the funds, I combine the portfolio holdings information
of the funds with ethical stock ratings data. By deﬁnition SRI investors are
supposed to derive utility from the social and environmental aspects of their
investments. I therefore expect that investors in the SRI fund market care about
ethical standards. I further conjecture that their sensitivity to ethical standards
increases over time, because in a growing market they can choose that fund
which satisﬁes their needs best.
Third I analyze whether SRI investors are more likely to reinvest in the same
fund than conventional investors. SRI investors face search costs if they want
to identify a SRI fund ﬁtting their personal values and their ﬁnancial goals.
Contrary to the SRI investors, conventional investors have only to align their
funds with their ﬁnancial goals and not with non-ﬁnancial ones; their search
costs are presumably lower than for SRI investors. Higher search costs induce
SRI investors to reinvest in the same fund in the future. The search costs
argument leads to a higher autocorrelation in fund ﬂows for the SRI funds.
I ﬁnd the following main results: (i) Over the whole sample period SRI
investors seem to chase past top performing funds, but not to sell poor perform-
ing funds to the same extent. This behavior is similar to that of conventional
investors and in line with the results of Bollen (2007) and Renneboog et al.
(2006).5 However, along with the fast development of the SRI fund market,
5Bollen (2007) examines the performance ﬂow relationship of SRI mutual funds in the US.
3the performance sensitivity of the SRI investors has increased over time. SRI
investors chase past top performing funds to a greater extent in the second
half of the sample period than in the ﬁrst one. This result is consistent with
the assumption that with an increasing number of SRI funds, the number of
alternatives grows and thus SRI investors are more performance sensitive. This
ﬁnding is also consistent with the conjecture that the SRI pioneers in the early
stages of the SRI market cared less about performance and that today they
are outnumbered by mainstream SRI investors who value performance. The
SRI investors nowadays chase past top performing funds at least as much as
conventional investors do. (ii) Consistent with the conjecture I ﬁnd that SRI
investors care about the actual ethical standards of the mutual funds. They
are not satisﬁed with the funds being labeled as SRI funds. They prefer funds
with high ethical standards regarding the positive rating which consists of the
criteria community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights,
and product. The sensitivity to ethical standards regarding the positive rating
increases over time. This ﬁnding is in line with the expectation that in the
fast growing SRI market investors choose that fund which satisﬁes their needs
best. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that SRI investors especially prefer funds with high
environmental standards. The interest in environmental standards is probably
sparked by the frequent reports about environmental issues such as global
warming or alternative energy solutions in the public press. (iii) I document
a higher positive autocorrelation in ﬂows for the SRI mutual funds than for
the conventional funds. This is in line with the conjecture that SRI investors
face higher search costs than conventional investors and thus are more likely to
Renneboog et al. (2006) investigate the determinants of SRI mutual fund ﬂows around the
world. Louche and Lydenberg (2006) and Scholtens and Dam (2007) point out that there exist
cultural diﬀerences concerning social responsibility.
4reinvest in the same fund they already own.
Overall, I conclude that nowadays SRI investors invest disproportionately
more in funds with past top performance – similar to conventional investors –
but additionally pay attention to the actual ethical standards of their investments.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The data and the design
of the study are described in Section 2. In Section 3 the empirical results are
reported. Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Data
To study how SRI investors react to past performance and ethical standards
when investing in SRI funds and to compare their investment behavior to that of
conventional investors, I combine the information of ﬁve diﬀerent databases: the
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database, the KLD Stats database,
the Thomson Financial Mutual Fund Holdings database, the CRSP US Stock
database, and the Morningstar Principia database. For my sample of US equity
funds in the period from 1992 to 2004, I retrieve information about the fund
characteristics such as size, loads, returns, turnover, age, and expense ratio from
the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database.
There exists no direct measure for the ethical standards of mutual funds.
To obtain ethical rankings for mutual funds, I combine the portfolio holdings
of the funds with ethical stock ratings data. The procedure I use is similar to
5the one used by Kempf and Osthoﬀ (2008). In a ﬁrst step, I prepare the ethical
stock ratings data retrieved from the KLD Stats Database. This database
is free of survivorship bias and covers annual ratings for all S&P 500 and
Domini 400 Social Index (DSI 400) stocks over the period from 1992 to 2004.
KLD has extended their stock coverage through time. From 2001 onwards
ethical ratings are provided for all stocks of the Russell 1000 and from 2003
onwards for all stocks of the Russell 3000. KLD evaluates the stocks using
multiple criteria which can be classiﬁed into two broad categories: qualitative
and exclusionary criteria.6 The qualitative criteria are community, diversity,
employee relations, environment, human rights, and product.7 By following the
positive screening approach investors use these criteria to evaluate the ethical
standards of companies and then select the companies with the highest ethical
standards. Each qualitative criterion consists of several sub-criteria for which
KLD provides a binary score. To calculate a single rating for each qualitative
criterion, I average all binary scores as done by Kempf and Osthoﬀ (2007). Then
I average all these qualitative ratings to obtain a positive overall rating (hereafter
referred to as positive rating) between 0 and 1. The higher the rating, the higher
the social responsibility of the company. The exclusionary criteria, which are
used for the negative screening, are alcohol, tobacco, gambling, military, and
nuclear power. Investors following a negative screening policy avoid companies
involved in these controversial business areas. To obtain a negative overall
rating (hereafter referred to as negative rating), I assign a one to a company
if it is not involved in any of these controversial business areas and a zero if
6For more detailed information about the KLD Stats database and the criteria used see
http://www.kld.com/research/stats/indicators.html.
7KLD also provides a criterion "Corporate Governance" which is not used in this study.
This criterion diﬀers in many respects from the corporate governance issues used by Gompers
et al. (2003) for their corporate governance index.
6the company is involved in at least one controversial business area. Since I use
ethical ratings of US stocks to evaluate the ethical standards of the mutual
funds, I exclude from my sample all international, bond, and money market funds.
In a second step, I prepare the mutual fund holdings data. The holdings
data for the period from 1992 to 2003 is retrieved from the Thomson Financial
Mutual Fund Holdings database, which is free of survivorship bias (see Wermers
(2000)), and the holdings data for 2004 is retrieved from the CRSP Survivor-Bias
Free US Mutual Fund database. To obtain a complete record of the stock
holdings for each fund along with other fund characteristics such as size, loads,
returns, turnover, age, and expense ratio over my sample period, I merge these
two databases. The two databases are matched by fund ticker and fund name
information.8 Although in the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund
database multiple share classes are listed as diﬀerent funds, they are based on
the same set of holdings. I aggregate diﬀerent share classes of the same fund by
weighting the respective fund characteristic with the previous year’s total net
assets under management of that share class. For some fund characteristics a
diﬀerent aggregation method is used. The age of a fund is the age of the oldest
share class; the total net assets of a fund are the sum of total net assets of all
share classes. The procedure is similar to the one used by Wermers (2000).
Finally, I retrieve the prices for the stocks held by the funds from the CRSP
US Stock database. The database covers all stocks traded at the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and NASDAQ.
In a third step, I now combine the mutual fund holdings with the stock
8For further details of the matching procedure please see Gaspar et al. (2006).
7ratings data to obtain an ethical ranking of the funds. For each fund I calculate
normalized portfolio weights for the rated stock positions at the end of the year.
I include only fund observations in my sample where the percentage of all stocks
is at least 50%. Then, I sum up these portfolio weights for the rated stocks
multiplied by the ethical stock ratings. This weighted sum is the aggregated
ethical rating for a mutual fund. Thereby, I implicitly assume that the rated
stocks behave like the stocks not rated. The average percentage of the rated
stocks for the SRI funds in my sample is 79%, and 70% for the conventional
funds. Based on the aggregated ratings I assign fractional ranks in each year
ranging from zero to one for both the group of SRI funds and the group of
conventional funds. The higher the ranking of a fund, the higher the ethical
standards of that fund. Posi,t denotes the ethical rank based on the positive
rating for fund i in year t; Negi,t denotes the ethical rank based on the negative
rating. Kempf and Osthoﬀ (2008) show that SRI funds indeed hold stocks with
higher ethical ratings than their conventional counterparts.9
Since I have no direct measure on net-inﬂows for mutual funds, I have to
calculate a synthetic measure. I employ the standard procedure in the literature
(see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) or Sirri and Tufano (1998)) to construct





TNAi,t is deﬁned as the total net assets under management of fund i in year
9In unreported results I conﬁrm the ﬁnding of Kempf and Osthoﬀ (2008).
10Ber and Ruenzi (2007) show that the synthetic measure is a good approximation for actual
fund ﬂows.
8t. Ri,t denotes the total return of fund i in year t. Consequently, FLOWi,t
reﬂects the percentage growth of fund i minus the internal growth in year t.
It is assumed that ﬂows occur at the end of the year and that dividends and
distributions are reinvested in the same fund. I exclude fund year observations
from my sample where funds grew more than 1000%, because a higher growth
rate is probably due to data errors.11
To obtain a list of SRI mutual funds, I retrieve the SRI mutual funds from
the Morningstar Principia database for the time period from 1996 to 2005 on
an annual frequency. I backdate the list of SRI funds from 1996 till 1992,
because no Morningstar data is available prior to 1996. In my sample I have
49 diﬀerent SRI funds and 2643 diﬀerent conventional funds which comply with
this restriction. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the SRI funds (Panel
A) and on the conventional funds (Panel B) in my sample.
- insert Table 1 about here -
The number of funds is increasing over time for both groups of funds. The
number of funds in the young SRI market grew especially rapidly. While the
number of conventional funds quintupled, the number of SRI funds increased
tenfold. Figure 1(a) presents the development of the total assets under manage-
ment for the SRI and conventional funds over time. Whereas the total assets
of the conventional funds grew faster in the ﬁrst part of my sample period, the
total assets of the SRI funds grew constantly faster in the second part of my
sample period. These results are conﬁrmed by Figure 1(b) which shows the
11Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) also exclude fund observations with a growth rate above
1000%.
9percentage growth of the SRI and conventional fund market minus the internal
growth over time. The average net-growth for the SRI funds with about 17% p.a.
is slightly higher than for conventional funds with about 14% p.a. The average
SRI fund is smaller in size and younger than the average conventional fund.
Furthermore, the average SRI fund has higher expense ratios than the average
conventional fund, although the loads are lower. The lower turnover rate for
the SRI funds indicates that they trade less than their conventional counterparts.
- insert FIGURE 1 about here -
2.2 Model
To compare the performance sensitivity of SRI investors to the performance
sensitivity of conventional investors, I investigate how past fund performance
inﬂuences the net-inﬂows in SRI and conventional funds. In the literature ordinal
performance measures (ranks) are often used instead of cardinal measures to
analyze the impact of performance on net-inﬂows.12 Studies comparing ordinal
and cardinal measures have shown that ordinal measures explain fund ﬂows
much better than cardinal measures (see Patel et al. (1994) and Navone (2003)).
The survey studies of Capon et al. (1994) and Capon et al. (1996) conﬁrm
this result. Therefore, I calculate performance ranks, PerfRanki,t, within
segments based on raw returns. The procedure to construct the performance
ranks is similar to the one used by Sirri and Tufano (1998). I sort the funds
in every segment according to their realized returns. The segments I use are
12Examples for studies using ordinal measures are: Patel et al. (1994), Sirri and Tufano
(1998), Fant and O’Neal (2000), and Bergstresser et al. (2006). Studies using cardinal measures
are, for example: Ippolito (1992) and Lynch and Musto (2003).
10"Socially Responsible,", "Small Company Growth," "Other Aggressive Growth,"
"Growth," "Income," "Growth and Income," "Balanced," and "Sector Funds."13
Then I assign fractional ranks to the funds in each segment which I normalize
between zero and one. The fund with the highest return gets assigned rank one.
Previous studies document a convex relationship between the fund ﬂows and
performance.14 To study the convex relation, I adopt the approach of Sirri and
Tufano (1998) and employ a piecewise linear regression. I estimate three slope
coeﬃcients based on the fractional performance ranks; one for the bottom quin-
tile, one for the three middle quintiles, and one for the top quintile. I estimate
the complete model using a pooled regression with White’s (1980) correction for
heteroscedasticity. It reads:15
FLOWi,t = α1Lowi,t−1 + α2Midi,t−1 + α3Topi,t−1 (2)













Midi,t−1 = min(PerfRanki,t−1 − Lowi,t−1,0.6)
13CRSP does not provide general investment objectives for the whole time period. Therefore,
I use the classiﬁcations by Wiesenberger (OBJ), ICDI (ICDI_OBJ), and Strategic Insight
(SI_OBJ) to obtain uniform investment objectives. The procedure is similar to the one used
by Pastor and Stambaugh (2002).
14See, e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Ippolito (1992).
15Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) also use a pooled regression with White’s (1980) correction
for heteroscedasticity.
11Topi,t−1 = PerfRanki,t−1 − (Lowi,t−1 + Midi,t−1).
The dependent variable, FLOWi,t, reﬂects the net-growth of a fund i in year
t as described in 1. I use an annual frequency to examine the determinants
of fund ﬂows. I include all independent variables as lagged variables, because
investors can only base their investment decision on the information available at
the beginning of the year.
The fractional performance ranks, PerfRanki,t−1, are decomposed into
three groupings: Lowi,t−1, Midi,t−1, and Topi,t−1. The coeﬃcients on these
three groupings represent the slope of the performance ﬂow relationship in the
respective quintile(s). To study potential diﬀerences regarding performance
between SRI and conventional funds, I interact the performance variables with
the SRi,t−1 dummy. SRi,t−1 takes on the value one for a SRI fund and zero for a
conventional fund. For example, the coeﬃcient α6 is the additional increase in
fund ﬂows for the top performing SRI funds, compared to the estimated slope
coeﬃcient α3 for the conventional funds.
I also control for the net-inﬂows of the fund in the previous year, FLOWi,t−1.
Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Zeckhauser et al. (1991) ﬁnd a positive impact
of the previous fund ﬂows on the subsequent fund ﬂows. One reason for the
positive autocorrelation in ﬂows could be that I do not control for speciﬁc fund
characteristics which have an inﬂuence on ﬂows and are constant over time.
Another reason might be that investors suﬀer from a status-quo bias. This bias
predicts that investors repeatedly facing the same investment situation tend
to decide in favor of the same alternative regardless of whether this decision
12is optimal because of changed conditions. This behavior leads to positive
autocorrelation in ﬂows.16 For SRI funds one may expect an even higher positive
autocorrelation in ﬂows because of search costs. SRI investors have to put more
time and eﬀort into ﬁnding the SRI fund which suits to their personal values, and
thus are likely to reinvest in this fund when facing future investment decisions.
For this reason I interact the past net-inﬂows with the SRi,t−1 dummy.
v
j
i,t−1 is a vector consisting of the following control variables: risk
(Riski,t−1), size (Sizei,t−1), age (Agei,t−1), total loads (Loadsi,t−1), expense
ratio (ExpRatioi,t−1), and turnover ratio (Turnoveri,t−1). Previous studies have
shown an impact of these variables on fund ﬂows. I control for the risk of a
fund, Riski,t−1, measured by the annualized standard deviation of the monthly
returns. Barber et al. (2005), Ippolito (1992), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) ﬁnd
a marginal negative impact of risk on fund ﬂows.
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) ﬁnd a negative
impact of fund size, Sizei,t−1, on fund ﬂows. I include the logarithm of the size
of a fund, because large funds probably grow slower than small funds. This
approach is in line with the literature.
Furthermore, I control for the age of a fund, Agei,t−1. Consistent with the
literature I consider the logarithm of age. Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) identify a negative impact of age on fund ﬂows.
The fees of a fund are a further factor which inﬂuences the fund ﬂows. Sirri
16For a detailed description of the status-quo bias see also Kempf and Ruenzi (2006).
13and Tufano (1998) assume a holding period of seven years for a fund and take
the sum of the expense ratio plus one seventh of the total loads. They ﬁnd a
negative inﬂuence for this constructed fee measure on fund ﬂows. Bergstresser
and Poterba (2002) and Ruenzi (2005) consider separately the expense ratio
and the total loads of a fund. They report a negative impact for the expense
ratio and a positive impact for the total loads. This could be due to the fact
that loads are often used for marketing eﬀorts, but expenses negatively aﬀect
performance. I follow their approach and control for the total loads, Loadsi,t−1,
and the expense ratio, ExpRatioi,t−1.
To investigate whether investors mind how much a fund trades, I include the
turnover, Turnoveri,t−1. While Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) document no
signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the turnover on fund ﬂow, Kempf and Ruenzi (2006) ﬁnd
a positive inﬂuence.
Finally, I include time-segment interaction dummies as done by Del Guer-
cio and Tkac (2002) – one for each combination of year and segment. The
time component captures diﬀering average ﬂows over the sample years. The
segment component captures diﬀering demands across the segments. Thus,
the combination of these components adjusts for both potential eﬀects –
diﬀering demand over segments and over time. Table 1 shows that the growth of
SRI mutual funds diﬀers from the growth of conventional mutual funds over time.
In addition to the piecewise linear regression as described in Model 2, I also
implement an alternative model to consider the convex relationship between the
fund ﬂows and performance. I apply the approach of Barber et al. (2005) and
14estimate a quadratic relationship between the performance ranks and fund ﬂows
by adding a linear term and a quadratic term for the performance ranks as ex-
planatory variables. This alternative model reads:
















The performance ﬂow relationship is convex if the coeﬃcient of the squared per-
formance rank is positive.
3 Empirical Results
In a ﬁrst step I study whether the performance sensitivity of SRI investors diﬀers
from conventional investors and whether it changes over time (Section 3.1). Then
I investigate whether SRI investors care about the actual ethical standards of the
SRI funds (Section 3.2).
3.1 Investor behavior regarding performance
To compare the reaction regarding past performance of SRI investors to that
of conventional investors, I estimate Model 2 and 3 using a pooled regression
with White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity. The results are reported
in Table 2.
- insert Table 2 about here -
15I ﬁnd that all estimated slope coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly positive in Col-
umn 2 for the conventional funds. The slope coeﬃcient of the top performance
quintile is about four times as large as the slope coeﬃcient of the three middle
quintiles and even larger in comparison to the slope coeﬃcient of the low quintile.
Thus, the conventional investors respond diﬀerently to high and low performance.
They disproportionately invest in the last year’s top performing funds, but they
do not punish poor performing funds to the same extent. The results conﬁrm
the earlier ﬁnding in the literature (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and
Sirri and Tufano (1998)) that the performance ﬂow relationship is asymmetric
and convex. Goetzmann and Peles (1997) explain the absence of signiﬁcant
outﬂows of the poor performing funds by cognitive dissonance. Investors stick
to the poor performing funds, because otherwise they would have to admit to
themselves that they came to the wrong investment decision before.
I ﬁnd a similar result for the SRI investors. They also disproportionately
chase past top performing funds. All slope coeﬃcients for the SRI funds do
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the slope coeﬃcients for the conventional funds.17
Each estimated slope coeﬃcient for the SRI funds is composed of that for the
conventional funds plus the estimated additional impact for the SRI funds. For
example the estimated slope coeﬃcient in the top performing quintile for the
SRI funds is about 2.49. An increase of ten percentiles in the top performing
quintile for the SRI funds, for example from 0.85 to 0.95, boosts asset growth
by about 25% p.a., all else equal. The result that SRI investors chase past top
performing funds is in line with the ﬁndings of Bollen (2007) and Renneboog
17I also investigated the performance ﬂow relationship separately for the SRI funds. I ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcients for the three middle quintiles and the top quintile are signiﬁcantly positive;
the coeﬃcient on the low quintile is not signiﬁcant.
16et al. (2006). The estimated performance ﬂow relationship of Model 2 can be
seen graphically in Figure 2. Figure 2 presents the convexity of the performance
ﬂow relationship for the conventional and SRI funds.
- insert FIGURE 2 about here -
The results concerning the performance ﬂow relationship in Column 3 support
the ﬁnding that the relation is convex for the conventional funds. The relation
for the SRI funds is also convex. The signiﬁcantly lower coeﬃcient of the linear
SRI performance term in conjunction with the not signiﬁcant higher quadratic
term indicates that SRI investors invest slightly more in low performing funds,
but still disproportionately invest more in top performing funds. Overall, the
results of Columns 2 and 3 suggest that SRI investors chase past top performing
funds the way conventional investors do.
For the further determinants of the net-inﬂows into mutual funds, I ﬁnd
similar results for both models. Therefore, I describe in the following only the
results of Column 2. The estimated coeﬃcient of the lagged ﬂow, FLOWi,t−1,
is positive and signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with the status-quo bias
behavior of mutual fund investors. Previous studies such as Gruber (1996),
Patel et al. (1994), and Fant and O’Neal (2000) also document a strong positive
impact of the lagged ﬂow on the subsequent ﬂow. The additional impact for the
SRI funds is even signiﬁcantly higher. The total impact for the conventional
funds is only about 15% p.a., whereas that of the SRI funds is about 33% p.a.,
all else equal. The high positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the lagged ﬂows for
SRI funds is in line with my conjecture that SRI investors face higher search
costs than conventional investors. SRI investors have to put more time and
17eﬀort in identifying the SRI funds which ﬁt their personal values and then are
more likely to reinvest in those funds in the future.
The relation between the control variables and net-inﬂows of mutual funds is
in line with previous ﬁndings in the literature. The fund risk, measured by the
standard deviation of monthly returns, has no signiﬁcant impact on net-inﬂows.
Investors seem not to care about the risk of the funds. The coeﬃcient of the size
and age of a fund is signiﬁcantly negative. This result indicates that large (old)
mutual funds receive less inﬂow than smaller (younger) mutual funds. While the
total loads have a signiﬁcant and positive impact on subsequent net-inﬂows, the
expense ratio has signiﬁcant and negative impact on subsequent net-inﬂows. The
estimated coeﬃcient on the fund turnover indicates whether investors care about
the trading activity of the funds. I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact for the funds. The
adjusted R2 for Model 2 is 13.30% and 13.16% for Model 3. The time-segment
interaction dummies not reported in the table are mostly signiﬁcant.
To examine whether the performance sensitivity of SRI investors depends
on the development of the SRI fund market, I split the sample into a ﬁrst
sub-period from 1993 to 1998 and a second sub-period from 1999 to 2004.
Table 3 summarizes the estimates of Model 2 and Model 3 sub-samples. The
performance ﬂow relationship of the conventional funds is positive and convex in
both sub-periods. In contrast to this ﬁnding, the performance ﬂow relationship
for the SRI funds changes over time. While in the ﬁrst sub-period the perfor-
mance ﬂow relationship for the SRI funds is not so pronounced, the relationship
in the second sub-period is even more convex than for conventional funds. The
additional impact in the ﬁrst sub-period is signiﬁcantly negative for the middle
18and top quintiles. In the second sub-period the estimated SRI coeﬃcient on the
top quintile is signiﬁcantly positive. The results for the quadratic speciﬁcation
of the performance rank are similar. Overall, SRI investors chase top performing
funds to a larger extent in the sub-period from 1999 to 2004 than from 1993 to
1998. This result is consistent with the conjecture that along with the fast grow-
ing SRI market the performance sensitivity increased. This can be attributed to
the fact that with an increasing number of SRI funds the number of alternatives
grew and thus SRI investors became more performance sensitive over the years.
Another explanation for this ﬁnding is that SRI early adopters cared less about
performance than the mainstream SRI investors today. The SRI early adopters
may have derived more utility from the social and environmental aspects of their
funds. Since the SRI market has grown from a tiny niche to a respectable market
segment, SRI investors nowadays seem to chase past top performing funds even
more than conventional investors. This ﬁnding may result from mainstream
SRI investors being more alert to an inferior performance due to ethical
investment restrictions and thus trying to counteract it by the selection of top
performers. SRI fund managers have to perform well to attract additional inﬂows.
- insert Table 3 about here -
The autocorrelation in fund ﬂows remains signiﬁcantly positive for the con-
ventional funds in both sub-periods. As for the whole sample, the SRI funds
exhibit a even stronger autocorrelation in ﬂows in both sub-periods indicating
that SRI investors have higher search costs and therefore reinvest more in the
same funds. Only for the piecewise linear speciﬁcation in the second sub-period
(Column 4) is the estimate marginally not signiﬁcant. The results regarding the
control variables remain qualitatively unchanged. Only for the second sub-period
19do I ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of the expense ratios on ﬂows is not signiﬁcantly neg-
ative anymore. Today investors seem to care less about the expenses of their
funds.
3.2 Investor behavior regarding ethical standards
To investigate whether SRI investors care about the actual ethical standards
of the SRI funds, I augment Model 2 and 3 by including the positive rating,
Posi,t−1, and the negative rating, Negi,t−1. The construction of these ratings is
described in Section 2.1. Table 4 reports the results of the extended models.
- insert Table 4 about here -
I ﬁnd neither any signiﬁcant impact of the positive rating nor of the negative
rating for the conventional funds in both models. As expected, conventional
investors seem not to care about the ethical standards of their funds. However,
I ﬁnd evidence that, consistent with my conjecture, SRI investors care about
the ethical standards, i.e., how the SRI funds actually invest. The coeﬃcient
of the positive rating is signiﬁcantly positive. An increase from the lowest rank
to the highest rank regarding the positive rating is associated with an increase
in net-inﬂows from about 23% p.a., all else equal. In contrast to the positive
rating, the negative rating has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the inﬂows of SRI funds.
The negative screening approach seems not to be popular among SRI investors.
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that SRI investors prefer funds with high ethical
standards regarding the positive rating and that they do look behind the label
"SRI fund".
20The performance ﬂow relationship is similar to the one reported in Table 2
earlier. For the quadratic performance term in Column 3 I now ﬁnd a marginal
signiﬁcantly positive impact, suggesting that SRI investors react even more
strongly to top performing funds. However, the result is not conﬁrmed by the
piecewise linear speciﬁcation (Column 2). The estimates of the lagged ﬂow and
the control variables remain qualitatively unchanged.
To examine whether the investment behavior of SRI investors regarding the
ethical standards has changed over time, I split the sample as before into a
ﬁrst sub-period from 1993 to 1998 and a second sub-period from 1999 to 2004.
Table 5 summarizes the results.
- insert Table 5 about here -
I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relation between fund ﬂows and the positive and negative
rating for the conventional funds in both sub-periods. In the ﬁrst sub-period
the estimates of the additional impact on SRI funds of the positive rating are
marginally signiﬁcant in Column 2, but not in Column 3. Therefore, I ﬁnd
only weak evidence that SRI investors care about the positive rating in the ﬁrst
sub-period. However, in second sub-period I ﬁnd that SRI investors care about
the positive rating – the estimates are signiﬁcant and almost double compared
to the ﬁrst sub-period. For the negative rating I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the ﬂows, as for the whole sample period. Overall, today’s SRI investors seem
to care more about the actual ethical standards of their funds. The performance
ﬂow relationship remains similar to that of Table 3. Only the estimate on the
additional impact for the low performance quintile is now signiﬁcantly negative,
indicating that SRI funds with a low performance get inﬂows. This could be
21because some SRI investors do not ﬁnd any alternatives for these funds. The
estimates of the lagged ﬂows and the control variables remain qualitatively
unchanged.
The positive and negative rating studied earlier consist of several criteria. To
investigate whether the single criteria have an inﬂuence on fund net-inﬂows, I
replace the positive rating with the ethical rankings of the criteria – community,
diversity, employee relations, human rights, and product. The negative rating is
replaced with ethical rankings of the criteria alcohol, gambling, military, nuclear,
and tobacco. Table 6 reports the results.
- insert Table 6 about here -
There exists no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of a single criterion on ﬂows for the con-
ventional funds. The ﬂows of SRI funds are also not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
most single criteria. However, the criterion environment has a signiﬁcantly pos-
itive impact on ﬂows in both models. SRI investors prefer to buy funds with
high actual environmental standards. The interest in environmental issues such
as global warming or eﬃcient use of energy is probably aroused by the frequent
reports in the public press. The performance ﬂow relationship is similar to the
one reported before. SRI investors chase past winners. The estimates for the
lagged ﬂow and control variables are not reported in Table 6. The results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
224 Conclusion
By deﬁnition SRI investors pursue not only ﬁnancial goals, but non-ﬁnancial
goals as well. In this paper I compare the performance sensitivity of SRI
investors’ investment decisions to that of conventional investors’ investment
decisions. In addition to the performance sensitivity I analyze whether SRI
investors consider the actual ethical standards of their investments. To explore
these issues, I investigate the ﬂows into SRI and conventional mutual funds. My
sample consists of US equity mutual funds in the period from 1993 to 2004.
I ﬁnd that along with the fast development of the SRI fund market the
performance sensitivity among SRI investors increased. While SRI investors in
the early stages of the market cared less about performance, they today chase
past top performing funds. This result is in line with the conjecture that SRI
investors today have more alternatives in the segment of SRI funds because
of the increasing number and thus choose the funds with a top performance
among the alternatives. The ﬁnding is also consistent with the assumption
that in the beginning SRI pioneers dominated the market and cared less
about performance than the mainstream SRI investors today. Furthermore,
I am the ﬁrst to analyze whether SRI investors care about the actual ethical
standards of their mutual funds. To measure the ethical standards of a fund,
I combine the portfolio holdings information with ethical stock ratings data.
I ﬁnd that SRI investors, in contrast to conventional investors, care about
the actual ethical standards regarding the positive rating and especially about
the criterion environment; they do not just care about the label "SRI fund".
The frequent reports about environmental issues in the public press may lead
23to the consideration of environmental standards when facing an investment
situation. Along with the development of the SRI market, the sensitivity to
the ethical standards regarding the positive rating has increased over time.
In addition to these ﬁndings I ﬁnd evidence that SRI investors have higher
search costs than conventional investors when selecting a fund and thus are
more likely to reinvest in the same funds in the future. SRI investors have to
identify not only a fund ﬁtting their ﬁnancial goals, but also their personal values.
Overall, my ﬁndings suggest that SRI investors are diﬀerent from conventional
investors. SRI investors today chase not only past top performing funds, but also
care about the ethical standards of their investments. A line for future research
may be to study how diﬀerent characteristics and attitudes of SRI investors aﬀect
their investment decisions.
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(b) Growth Rates of SRI and Conventional Funds
Notes: Figure (a) shows the development of the total assets under management (in million US dollars) for SRI
funds and conventional funds over time. Figure (b) shows the development of the growth rates of SRI funds
and conventional funds over time.
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Notes: The ﬁgure presents the performance ﬂow relationship for SRI funds and conventional funds. It is based
on the estimated slope coeﬃcients from Model 2 for the time period from 1993 to 2004.
31Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: SRI Funds
Year No. of funds Growth Size Age Expense Ratio Loads Turnover
1992 4 35.02 331.70 13.50 1.09 2.38 0.27
1993 4 −5.78 310.02 14.50 1.11 1.19 0.43
1994 8 −1.86 161.45 11.13 1.20 1.03 0.44
1995 11 7.54 194.37 10.45 1.43 1.58 0.46
1996 12 2.03 200.66 10.92 1.43 1.47 0.60
1997 21 17.46 166.88 7.90 1.44 1.08 0.76
1998 24 21.19 230.42 8.38 1.39 0.94 0.72
1999 26 30.97 327.74 9.27 1.40 1.06 0.69
2000 31 21.14 302.82 9.13 1.43 1.27 0.64
2001 33 16.07 269.29 9.39 1.37 1.41 0.64
2002 35 11.06 248.05 10.09 1.49 1.52 0.67
2003 39 16.11 362.67 10.56 1.45 1.83 0.70
2004 42 22.76 440.99 11.02 1.44 2.11 0.71
Total 290 17.40 295.11 9.92 1.41 1.48 0.66
Panel B: Conventional Funds
Year No. of funds Growth Size Age Expense Ratio Loads Turnover
1992 386 25.49 810.69 21.79 1.19 3.44 0.65
1993 404 21.55 1022.38 22.72 1.18 3.25 0.71
1994 736 11.16 733.43 17.08 1.26 2.51 0.76
1995 884 21.17 948.83 15.68 1.27 2.30 0.79
1996 1062 21.02 1153.37 14.82 1.25 2.15 0.82
1997 1180 24.84 1416.77 14.41 1.22 2.08 0.82
1998 1264 11.21 1697.14 14.48 1.22 2.02 0.87
1999 1376 9.11 2039.66 14.55 1.22 1.99 0.86
2000 1550 12.78 1752.69 13.89 1.24 1.98 0.91
2001 1659 13.72 1464.36 13.79 1.29 1.98 1.01
2002 1748 6.64 1093.29 14.15 1.33 1.95 0.95
2003 1789 13.90 1470.38 14.58 1.37 2.12 0.91
2004 1892 9.15 1625.11 14.73 1.38 2.36 0.88
Total 15930 13.82 1425.94 14.95 1.28 2.17 0.87
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the SRI funds (Panel A) and for the conventional funds (Panel
B) over the time period from 1992 to 2004. Year by year it presents the number of funds, average net-growth (in
percentage), average size (in million US dollars), average age (in years), average expenses (percentage of assets
invested), average loads (percentage total of all maximum front, deferred, and redemption fees), and average
turnover (minimum of aggregate purchases of securities or aggregate sales of securities, divided by the average
total net assets of the fund).





















Adj. R2 13.30% 13.16%
Notes: Estimation results are based on Model 2 (Column 1) and 3 (Column 2). The dependent variable,
FLOWi,t, reﬂects the percentage growth of fund i minus the internal growth in year t. The explanatory
variables are contained in Column 1. The last line contains the adjusted R2. The total number of observations
is 15732; 15447 observations apply to the conventional funds and 285 observations apply to the SRI funds. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.














FLOWi,t−1 0.1429∗∗∗ 0.1457∗∗∗ 0.1494∗∗∗ 0.1521∗∗∗
SRi,t−1FLOWi,t−1 0.1600∗∗ 0.1597∗∗ 0.1377 0.1611∗
Riski,t−1 0.4120 0.4708 −0.3242 −0.3446
Sizei,t−1 −0.0484∗∗∗ −0.0484∗∗∗ −0.0415∗∗∗ −0.0416∗∗∗
Agei,t−1 −0.0537∗∗∗ −0.0525∗∗∗ −0.0613∗∗∗ −0.0612∗∗∗
Loadsi,t−1 1.7748∗∗∗ 1.7778∗∗∗ 1.1142∗∗∗ 1.1107∗∗∗
ExpRatioi,t−1 −5.2642∗∗∗ −5.0941∗∗∗ −2.0001 −2.0379
Turnoveri,t−1 0.0045 0.0047 0.0240 0.0244
Adj. R2 16.36% 16.14% 11.60% 11.50%
Notes: Estimation results are based on Model 2 and 3 for two sub-periods: 1993-1998 (Columns 2-3) and
1999-2004 (Columns 4-5). The dependent variable, FLOWi,t, reﬂects the percentage growth of fund i minus
the internal growth in year t. The explanatory variables are contained in Column 1. The last line contains
the adjusted R2. The total number of observations is 5552 (10180) for the period 1993-1998 (1999-2004); 5473
(9974) observations apply to the conventional funds and 79 (206) observations apply to the SRI funds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

























Adj. R2 13.31% 13.16%
Notes: Estimation results are based on Model 2 (Column 2) and 3 (Column 3) extended by the positive rating
and the negative rating as additional explanatory variables. The dependent variable, FLOWi,t, reﬂects the
percentage growth of fund i minus the internal growth in year t. The explanatory variables are contained in
Column 1. The last line contains the adjusted R2. The total number of observations is 15732; 15447 observations
apply to the conventional funds and 285 observations apply to the SRI funds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.















Posi,t−1 0.0116 0.0122 0.0186 0.0192
Negi,t−1 −0.0198 −0.0164 −0.0129 −0.0117
SRi,t−1Posi,t−1 0.1685∗ 0.1505 0.2971∗∗ 0.3014∗∗
SRi,t−1Negi,t−1 0.0047 0.0034 −0.1278 −0.1404
FLOWi,t−1 0.1427∗∗∗ 0.1456∗∗∗ 0.1492∗∗∗ 0.1520∗∗∗
SRi,t−1FLOWi,t−1 0.1413∗∗ 0.1402∗∗ 0.1388 0.1611∗
Riski,t−1 0.4118 0.4631 −0.3273 −0.3502
Sizei,t−1 −0.0484∗∗∗ −0.0485∗∗∗ −0.0416∗∗∗ −0.0417∗∗∗
Agei,t−1 −0.0539∗∗∗ −0.0526∗∗∗ −0.0614∗∗∗ −0.0613∗∗∗
Loadsi,t−1 1.7667∗∗∗ 1.7715∗∗∗ 1.1082∗∗∗ 1.1048∗∗∗
ExpRatioi,t−1 −5.1578∗∗∗ −5.0012∗∗ −1.9496 −1.9870
Turnoveri,t−1 0.0045 0.0048 0.0243 0.0247
Adj. R2 16.31% 16.09% 11.61% 11.51%
Notes: Estimation results are based on Model 2 and 3 extended by the positive rating and the negative rating as
additional explanatory variables for two sub-periods: 1993-1998 (Columns 2-3) and 1999-2004 (Columns 4-5).
The dependent variable, FLOWi,t, reﬂects the percentage growth of fund i minus the internal growth in year
t. The explanatory variables are contained in Column 1. The last line contains the adjusted R2. The total
number of observations is 5552 (10180) for the period 1993-1998 (1999-2004); 5473 (9974) observations apply to
the conventional funds and 79 (206) observations apply to the SRI funds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.



































Adj. R2 13.32% 13.17%
Notes: Estimation results are based on Model 2 (Column 2) and 3 (Column 3) extended by single qualitative
and exclusionary criteria as additional explanatory variables. The dependent variable, FLOWi,t, reﬂects the
percentage growth of fund i minus the internal growth in year t. The explanatory variables are contained in
Column 1. The last line contains the adjusted R2. The total number of observations is 15732; 15447 observations
apply to the conventional funds and 285 observations apply to the SRI funds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance
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